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Abstract—Many proximity-based mobile social networks are
developed to facilitate connections between any two people, or to
help a user to find people with matched profile within a certain
distance. A challenging task in these applications is to protect
the privacy the participants’ profiles and personal interests.
In this paper, we design novel mechanisms, when given a
preference-profile submitted by a user, that search a person with
matching-profile in decentralized multi-hop mobile social net-
works. Our mechanisms are privacy-preserving: no participants’
profile and the submitted preference-profile are exposed. Our
mechanisms establish a secure communication channel between
the initiator and matching users at the time when the matching
user is found. Our rigorous analysis shows that our mechanism
is secure, privacy-preserving, verifiable, and efficient both in
communication and computation. Extensive evaluations using
real social network data, and actual system implementation on
smart phones show that our mechanisms are significantly more
efficient then existing solutions.
Index Terms—Private Profile Matching, Secure Communica-
tion, Decentralized Mobile Social Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
A boom in mobile hand-held devices greatly enriches the
social networking applications. Many social networking ser-
vices are available on mobile phones (e.g., JuiceCaster and
MocoSpace) and majority of them are location-aware (e.g.,
FourSquare, BrightKite and Loopt). However, most of them
are designed for facilitating people connection based on their
real life social relationship. There is an increasing difficulty
of befriending new people or communicating with strangers
while protecting the privacy of real personal information.
Friending and communication are two important basic func-
tions of social networks. When people join social networks,
they usually begin by creating a profile, then interact with
other users. The content of profile could be very broad, such as
personal background, hobbies, contacts, places they have been
to. Profile matching is a common and helpful way to make new
friends with common interest or experience, find lost connec-
tions, or search for experts. Some applications help a user
automatically find users with similar profile within a certain
distance. For example, in the proximity-based mobile social
network ”Color”, using the GPS and Bluetooth capabilities
on phones, people in close proximity (within 50 meters) can
share photo automatically based on their similarity. MagnetU
[1] matches one with nearby people for dating, friend-making.
Small-talks [24] connects proximate users based on common
interests. These applications use profiles to facilitate friending
between strangers and also enable privacy preserving people
searching to some extent. Observe that in practice the mobile
Internet connection may not always be available and it may
incur high expense. Thus, the availability of short-range wire-
less technology such as WiFi and Bluetooth makes it possible
to build a new class of proximity-based decentralized (or ad
hoc) social networks with mobile phones [21], [27].
However the increasing privacy concern becomes a barrier
for mobile ad hoc social networking. People are unwilling
to disclose personal profiles to arbitrary persons in physical
proximity before deciding to interact with them. The insecure
wireless communication channel and potentially malicious ser-
vice provider increase the risk of revealing private information.
Friending based on private profile matching allows two users
to match their personal profiles without disclosing them to
each other. There are two mainstreams of approaches to solve
the privacy-preserving profile-based friending problem. The
first category treats a user’s profile as a set of attributes
and provide well-designed protocols to privately match users’
profiles based on private set intersection (PSI) and private
cardinality of set intersection (PCSI), [14], [23]. The second
category considers a user’s profile as a vector and measures
the social proximity by private vector dot product [9], [12],
[28]. They rely on public-key cryptosystem and homomorphic
encryption, which results in expensive computation cost and
usually requires a trusted third party. Multiple rounds of
interactions are required to perform the public key exchange
and private matching between each pair of parties, which
causes high communication cost in mobile social networks.
Presetting (e.g. exchange public keys) is often required by
these approaches before matching. In the final step of these
protocols, only one party learns the matching result, which
makes them unverifiable. And there lack efficient methods to
verify the result. Moreover, in these approaches, matched users
and unmatched users all get involved in the expensive compu-
tation and learn the matching result (e.g. profile intersection)
with the initiator despite different similarities between them.
Most of them are vulnerable to active attacks like dishonesty
and colluding adversary. These limitations hinder the adoption
of the SMC-related private matching methods in mobile social
networks.
Furthermore, a secure communication channel is also
equally important in mobile social networks. Although the
matching process is private, the following chatting may still
be disclosed to adversary and more privacy may be leaked.
Most work assume that there is a secure communication
channel established by using public key encryption system.
This involves a trusted third party and key management, which
is difficult to manage in decentralized mobile social networks.
Facing these challenges, we first formally define the privacy
preserving verifiable computation problem (Section II). We
then propose several protocols (Section III) to address the
privacy preserving profile matching and secure communication
channel establishment in decentralized social networks without
any presetting or trusted third party. We take advantage of
the common attributes between matching users, and use it to
encrypt a message with a secret key in it. In our mechanisms,
only a matching user can decrypt the message, and unmatched
users learn nothing. A privacy-preserving profile matching
and secure channel construction are completed simultane-
ously with one round communication. The secure channel
construction resists the man in the middle attack. A sequence
of well-designed schemes make our protocol practical, flex-
ible and lightweight, e.g., a remainder vector is designed
to significantly reduce the computation and communication
cost of unmatched users. Our profile matching mechanism is
also verifiable which thwarts cheating about matching result.
Both precise and fuzzy matching/search in a flexible form
are supported. The initiator can define a similarity threshold,
the participants whose similarity is below the threshold learns
nothing. We also design mechanism for location privacy pre-
served vicinity search based on our basic scheme. Compared
to most existing work (Section VI) relying on the asymmetric
cryptosystem and trust third party, our protocols require no
presetting and much less computation. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the first privacy-preserving verifiable
profile matching protocols based on symmetric cryptosystem.
We rigorously analyze the security and performance of our
mechanism (Section IV). We then conduct extensive evalu-
ations on the performances of our mechanisms using large
scale social network data, Tecent Weibo. Our evaluation results
(Section V) show that our mechanisms outperform existing
solutions significantly. We also implement our protocols in
laptop and mobile phones and measure the computation and
communication cost in real systems. In our mobile-phone
implementation, a user only needs about 1.3ms to generate
a friending request. For non-candidate users, on average, it
takes about 0.63ms to process this friending request, while
for candidate users, on average it takes about 7ms to process
this request.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. System Model
We consider a mobile ad hoc social networking system.
When a person joins a social network, he/she usually begins
by creating his/her own profile with a set of attributes. The at-
tribute can be anything generated by system or input by users,
including his/her location, places he/she has been to, his social
groups, experience, interests, contacts, keywords of his/her
blogs, etc. According to our analysis of two well-known social
networking systems (Facebook and Tecent Weibo), more than
90% users have unique profiles. Thus for most users, the
complete profile can be his/her fingerprint in social networks.
Then, in most social networks, friending usually takes two
typical steps: profile matching and communication. These
applications cause a number of privacy concerns.
1) Profile Privacy: The profiles of all the participants,
including the initiator, intermediate relay users and the
matching target, should not be exposed without their
consent. For the initiator, the required profile could be
his/her own profile or his/her desired person’ profile. For
other participants, e.g., the unmatched relay users and
the matching users, protecting their profiles is necessary
and can reduce the barrier to participate in the mobile
social networks (MSN). Note that, the exact location
information is also a part of the user’s profile privacy.
2) Communication Security: The messages between a
pair of users should be transmitted through a secure
communication channel. We emphasize that the secure
communication channel establishment has been ignored
in most previous work which address the private pro-
file matching in decentralized mobile social networks.
In practice, after profile matching, more privacy, even
profile information, may be exposed to adversaries via
communication through an insecure channel.
In this paper, we address the privacy preserving profile
matching and secure communication channel establishment
in decentralized social networks without any presetting or
trusted third party. We define the problem formally before
presenting our mechanism. Each user vk in a social network
has a profile which is a set consisting of mk attributes,
Ak = {a1k, a2k, ..., amkk }. The number of attributes is not
necessary the same for different users. Each attribute consists
of a header indicating its category name and a value field with
a single value or multiple values. An initiator vi represents
his/her desired user by a request attribute set with mt attributes
as At = {a1t , a2t , ..., amtt }. Our mechanism allows the initiator
to search a matching user in a flexible way by constructing
the request attribute set in the form of At = (Nt, Ot). Here
• Nt consists of α necessary attributes. All of them are
required to be owned by a matching user;
• Ot consists of the rest mt−α optional attributes. At least
β of them should be owned by a matching user.
The acceptable similarity threshold of a matching user is θ =
α+β
mt
. Let γ = mt − α− β. When γ = 0, an perfect match is
required. A matching user vm with a profile Am satisfies that
Nt ⊂ Am and |Ot ∩ Am| > β. (1)
When At ⊂ Am, vm is a perfect matching user. In a
decentralized mobile social network, a request will be spread
by relays until hitting a matching user or meeting a stop
condition, e.g. expiration time. When a matching user is found,
the initiator vi and the match user vm decide whether to
connect each other.
B. Adversary Model
In the profile matching phase, if a party obtains one or
more users (partial or full) attribute sets without the explicit
consents from those users, it is said to conduct user profiling
[14]. Two types of user profiling are taken into consideration.
In the honest-but-curious (HBC) model, a user tries to learn
more profile information than allowed by inferring from the
information he/she receives and relays but honestly follow the
mechanism. In a malicious model, an attacker deliberately de-
viates from the mechanism to learn more profile information.
In this work we consider several powerful malicious attacks.
Definition 1 (Dictionary profiling): A powerful attacker
who has obtained the dictionary of all possible attributes tries
to determine a specific user’s attribute set by enumerating or
guessing all likely attribute sets.
Most existing private profile matching approaches are vulner-
able to the dictionary profiling attack.
Definition 2 (Cheating): Cheating is another threat for most
existing private profile matching approaches. In the process of
profile matching, a participant may cheat by deviating from
the agreed protocol.
In the communication phase, an adversary can learn the
content of messages by eavesdropping. The construction of
a secure channel may suffer the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack. There are other saboteur attacks. In the deny of service
(DoS) attack, an adversary keeps sending profile matching
requests. The DoS attack can be prevented by restricting the
frequency of relay and reply requests from the same user. Note
that, some saboteur behaviors are precluded, such as alter or
drop the requests or replies.
C. Design Goal
The main goal and great challenge of our mechanism
is to conduct efficient matching against the user profiling
and cheating, as well as establish a secure communication
channel thwarting the MITM attack and eavesdropping in
a decentralized manner without a trust third party. In our
mechanism, a user can define a similarity threshold to protect
his/her privacy from the user whose similarity is not up to the
threshold. Specifically, We define different privacy protection
levels PPL(Ak, vj) of a profile Ak of vk against a user vj .
Definition 3 (Privacy Protection Level): Four different pri-
vacy protection levels (PPL0, PPL1, PPL2, PPL3) will be
discussed in this work. Specifically,
PPL0: If PPL(Ak, vj) = 0, vj can learn the profile Ak.
PPL1: If PPL(Ak, vj) = 1, vj can learn the intersection
of Ak and Aj .
PPL2: If PPL(Ak, vj) = 2, vj can learn the α necessary
attributes of Ak and the fact that at least β optional attributes
are satisfied. Specially, when α = 0, vj learns the fact that the
cardinality of Ak
⋂
Aj exceeds the threshold.
PPL3: If PPL(Ak, vj) = 3, vj learns nothing about Ak.
We design our mechanism to achieve PPL2 against match-
ing user and PPL3 against unmatching user in both HBC
and malicious model and thwart cheating. We also optimize
the mechanism to reduce the computation cost for unmatched
users. Furthermore, in our mechanism human interactions are
needed only to decide whether to connect their matching users.
III. PRIVACY PRESERVING PROFILE MATCHING AND
SECURE COMMUNICATION
Here we present our lightweight privacy preserving flexible
profile matching in decentralized mobile social networks with-
out any presetting or trust third party. A secure communication
channel is constructed between matching users.
A. Basic Mechanism
Observe that the intersection of the request profile and the
match profile is a nature common secret shared by the initiator
and the match user. The main idea of our mechanism is to
use the request profile as a key to encrypt a message. Only a
matching user, who shares the secret, can decrypt the message
with his/her profile efficiently.
Fig. 1 illustrates our basic privacy preserving search and
secure channel establishment mechanism. Here, we first draw
an outline of how the initiator creates a request package and
how a relay user handles the request package.
The initiator starts the process by creating a request profile
characterizing the matching user and a secret message for
him/her. The request profile is a set of sorted attributes.
Then he/she produces a request profile vector by hashing the
attributes of the request profile one by one. A profile key
is generated based on the request profile vector using some
publicly known hashing function. The initiator encrypts the
secret message with the profile key. A remainder vector of
the profile vector is yield for fast exclusion by a large portion
of unmatched persons. To support a flexible fuzzy search re-
quiring no perfect match, the initiator can define the necessary
attributes, optional attributes and the similarity threshold of
the matching profile. And a hint matrix is constructed from
the request vector according to the similarity definition, which
enables the matching person to recover the profile key. In the
end, the initiator packs the encrypted message, the remainder
vector and the hint matrix into a request package and sends it
out. Note that the required profile vector will not be sent out.
When a relay user receives a request from another user,
he/she first processes a fast check of his/her own profile vector
with the remainder vector. If no sub-vector of his/her profile
vector fits the remainder vector, he/she knows that he/she is
not a matching user and will forward the request to other relay
users immediately. Otherwise, he/she is a candidate target and
will generate a candidate profile vector set by some linear
computation with his/her profile and the hint matrix. Then a
candidate profile key set is obtained. In the basic mechanism,
If any key of his/her candidate key set can decrypt the message
correctly, he/she is an eligible person and the searching and
private messaging complete. Otherwise, he/she just forwards
the request to other relay users.
B. Profile Vector and Key Generation
To protect the profile privacy and support a fuzzy search, a
cryptographic hash (e.g. SHA-256) of the attribute is adopted
as the attribute equivalence criterion in this mechanism. How-
ever, due to the avalanche effect, even a small change in
the input will result in a mostly different hash. Although
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consistent attribute name can be provided by the social net-
working service, the attribute fields or the tags are created
by users. So a profile normalization is necessary before the
cryptographic hashing to ensure two attributes which are
considered equivalent to yield the same hash value. In our
mechanism, we use some common techniques to normalize
the users profile, including removing whitespace, punctuation,
accent marks and diacritics, converting all letters to lower
case, converting numbers (dates, currencies, etc.) into words,
text canonicalization, expanding abbreviations, converting the
plural words to singular form. After the profile normaliza-
tion, most inconsistences caused by spelling and typing are
eliminated. But the sematic equivalence between two different
words are not in this paper’s consideration.
Assume the cryptographic hash function is H which yields
n-bit length hash value. With an sorted normalized profile
vector Ak = [a1k, a
2
k, ..., a
m
k ]
T
, a profile vector Hk is
Hk = H(Ak) = [h
1
k, h
2
k, ..., h
m
k ]
T . (2)
Here hik = H(aik), which is n bit long.
A profile key is created with Hk,
Kk = H(Hk). (3)
Fig. 2 shows the profile vector and key generation of an exam-
ple profile. With the key of the required profile, the initiator
encrypts the secret message using a symmetric encryption
technique like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
C. Remainder Vector and Hint Matrix
So far, with the profile key, we have realized a naive
private profile matching and secure channel establishment. The
initiator sends out a message encrypted by the key of the
required profile. Any person who receives it tries to decrypt
the message with his/her own profile key. Only the exactly
matching person will decrypt the message correctly, and he/she
can construct a secure communication channel protected by the
profile key with the initiator. However, the naive mechanism
has some flaws making it unpractical.
1) The search is not flexible. The initiator cannot query any
subset of other’s profile. For example, he/she need to find
a ”student” studying ”computer science” regardless of the
”college”.
2) An perfect matching is required and no fuzzy search is
supported. In most case, the initiator need only find some
person with profile exceeding the required similarity
threshold to the requested profile.
3) All participants must decrypt the message, although most
of them hold wrong keys. It wastes the computation
resource and increases the search delay.
Improving the naive basic mechanism, our new mechanism
allows the initiator to search a person with mt required
attributes in a flexible way At = (Nt, Ot), as described in
Section II-A. In our mechanism we use a Remainder Vector
for fast excluding most unmatched users And a hint matrix is
designed to work with remainder vector to achieve efficient
free-form fuzzy search.
1) Remainder Vector: Assume that there are mt attributes
in the required profile, p is a prime integer larger than mt.
A remainder vector Rk consists of the remainders of all the
hashed attributes in the input profile vector divided by p, as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Rk = [h
1
k mod p, h
2
k mod p, ..., h
m
k mod p]
T . (4)
Then the following theorem is straightforward.
Theorem 1: Given two attributes’ hashes hi = H(ai) and
hj = H(aj). Remainder ri ≡ hi mod p. Remainder rj ≡ hj
mod p. If ri 6= rj , then hi 6= hj .
Assuming the required profile At = [a1t , a2t , ..., amtt ]T by an
initiator, the required profile vector is Ht = [h1t , h2t , ..., h
mt
t ]
T
.
Then the remainder vector of the required profile is Rt =
[r1t , r
2
t , ..., r
mt
t ]
T
. Assume that a relay user’s profile vector is
Hk. With remainder vector, a relay user simply calculates mt
candidate attribute subsets Hk(rit) fitting each rit. Here
∀hxk ∈ Hk(rit) : hxk mod p = rit. (5)
i.e., attributes in Hk(rit) yields the same remainder rit when
divided by p.
A combination of one element from each candidate attribute
subset forms a profile vector of the relay user. If the candidate
attribute subset Hk(rit) is ∅, the corresponding element in the
combination is unknown and the relay user fails to meet the
required attribute ait according to Theorem 1. The relay user
is a candidate matching user of the request if there exist at
least one combination which is an ordered set, denoted by Hc,
that satisfies the following:
1) The α necessary attributes are all known, i.e.
Hk(r
i
t) 6= ∅, ∀i ≤ α; (6)
2) The number of unknown elements don’t exceed γ, i.e.
|{Hk(rit)|α < i < mt, Hk(rit) = ∅}| ≤ γ; (7)
3) Since Ht and Hk are both sorted, the elements of Hc
should still keep the order consistent with the relay user’s
profile vector Hk, i.e.
∀hxk ∈ Hc, hyk ∈ Hc.
hxk ∈ Hk(rit), hyk ∈ Hk(rjt ), i < j ⇒ x < y.
(8)
We call Hc a candidate profile vector.
In a fuzzy search, during the fast checking procedure, if
there is no candidate profile vector that can be constructed
by the relay user’s profile vector, then he/she is not a match-
ing user and she/he can forward the package. An ordinary
relay user doesn’t have many attributes, commonly dozens of
attributes, so there won’t be many candidate profile vectors.
Using the remainder vector, quick exclusions of a portion of
unmatched users can be made.
2) Hint Matrix: A hint matrix is constructed to support a
flexible fuzzy search. It describes the linear constrain relation-
ship among the β+ γ optional attributes to help calculating γ
unknown attributes from β known attributes. The hint matrix
helps a matching user exceeding the similarity threshold to
recover the required profile vector, so as to generate the correct
profile key. Note that when a perfect matching user is required,
no hint matrix is needed.
The constrain matrix with γ rows and γ + β columns is
defined as:
Cγ×(γ+β) = [Iγ×γ , Rγ×β]. (9)
Here matrix I is a γ dimensional identity matrix, R is a matrix
of size γ×β, each of its elements is a random nonzero integer.
Multiplying the constrain matrix to the optional attributes
of the required profile vector, the initiator gets a matrix B:
B = C × [hα+1t , hα+2t , ..., hrt ]T (10)
Then the hint matrix M is defined as matrix C, followed by
matrix B, i.e.,
M = [C,B]. (11)
When γ > 0, the initiator generates the hint matrix and
sends it with the encrypt message and the remainder vector.
In a fuzzy search, after the fast checking procedure by the
remainder vector, if the relay user is a candidate matching
user, he/she constructs a set of candidate profile vector Hc
with unknowns.
Guaranteed by the definition of the candidate profile vector,
each Hc has no more than γ unknowns, and any unknown
hic, which is the i-th element of Hc, has i > α. Now, the
unknowns of a candidate profile vector can be calculated by
solving a system of linear equations:
C × [hα+1c , hα+2c , ..., hrc ]T = B (12)
Equivalently, we have
[I, R]× [hα+1c , hα+2c , ..., hrc ]T = B (13)
This system of equations has equal to or less than γ unknowns.
It can be easily proved that, it has a unique solution. With the
solution, a complete candidate profile vector H ′c is recovered.
For each H ′c, a candidate key Kc = H(H ′c) can be generated.
If any of the relay user’s candidate keys decrypts the message
correctly, he/she is a matching user and gets the encrypted
secret. Else, he/she forwards the request to the next person.
D. Location Attribute and Its Privacy Protection
In localization enabled mobile social networks, a user
usually searches matching users in vicinity. In the existing
systems, a user is required to provide his/her own current
location information and desired search range. However the
user’s accurate location will be exposed. In our mechanism,
location is considered as a dynamic attribute that will be up-
dated while the user moves. Accurate location is also the user’s
privacy. To conduct location privacy preserved vicinity search,
we design a scheme for location attribute matching based on
lattice. Our location attribute matching scheme is compatible
with our privacy preserved profile matching mechanism. When
generating the profile vector, we use lattice based hashing to
hash a user’s location and his/her vicinity region. A private
vicinity search can be easily conducted via our fuzzy search
scheme with the help of hint matrix.
1) Lattice based Location Hashing: We map the two-
dimensional location to the hexagonal lattice. The lattice point
is a discrete set of the centers of all regular hexagons, as the
dots shown in Fig. 3. The lattice is formally defined as:
{x = u1a1 + u2a2|(u1, u2) ∈ Z2} (14)
Here a1, a2 are linearly independent primitive vectors which
span the lattice. Given the primitive vectors a1, a2, a point
of the lattice is uniquely identified by the integer vector u =
(u1, u2). There are infinite choices for a1, a2. Let d denote
the shortest distance between lattice points, for simplicity, we
choose the primitive vectors as presented in Figure 3:
a1 = (d, 0); a2 = (
1
2
d,
√
3
2
d). (15)
Defining a geography location as the origin point O and the
scale of the lattice cell d, with the lattice definition, a location
can be hashed to its nearest lattice point. Any two locations
hashed to the same lattice point are inside a single hexagonal
lattice cell, and they are separated by a bounded distance d.
Given a user vk’s current location lk(t) at time t and his/her
vicinity range D, his/her vicinity region can be hashed to a
lattice point set, Vk(O, d, lk(t), D), consisting of the center
lattice point, i.e. the hash of lk(t), and other lattices points
whose distances to the center lattice point are less than D.
a1
a2
UserA UserB
Search Range
Fig. 3. Lattice-based location hash.
2) Location Privacy Preserved Vicinity Search: Intuitively,
given the distance bound to define vicinity, if two users are
within each other’s vicinity, the intersection of their vicin-
ity regions will have a proportion no less than a threshold
Θ. The initiator calculates his/her vicinity lattice point set
Vi(O, d, li(t), D) by defining O, d and D, here D indicates
his/her search range. Therefore, if a user vk is in his/her
vicinity, then vk’s vicinity lattice point set Vk(O, d, lk(t), D)
should satisfy the requirement:
θk =
|Vi(O, d, li(t), D)
⋂
Vk(O, d, lk(t), D)|
|Vk(O, d, lk(t), D)| ≥ Θ (16)
In the example in Fig. 3, user vA’s vicinity range D = 3d.
The lattice points within the red slashed hexagons constitute
VA(O, d, lA(t), D) and the lattice points within the blue back
slashed hexagons constitute VB(O, d, lB(t), D). The purple
grid region is the intersection of vicinity regions of vA and
vB . In this case, the threshold Θ should be 919 . In other words,
if VB(O, d, lB(t), D) contains no less than 9 common lattice
points of VA(O, d, lA(t), D), he/she is in the vicinity of vA. In
practice, the initiator can adjust the parameter d to change the
cardinality of the vicinity lattice point set to a suitable size.
To conduct location privacy preserved vicinity search, the
initiator won’t send his/her vicinity lattice point set directly.
Using the sorted lattice points, he/she generates a dynamic
profile key, a dynamic remainder vector and a dynamic hint
matrix in the same way as processing other attributes. So
a vicinity search works as a fuzzy search with similarity
threshold Θ. Only participants in his/her vicinity who has a
certain amount of common lattice points with him/her can
generate the correct dynamic profile key with the help of the
dynamic remainder vector and hint matrix.
3) Location Based Profile Matching: Compared to static
attributes like identity information, location is usually a tem-
poral privacy. With the dynamic key generated from location
information, we can improve the protection of a user’s static
attributes. When constructing profile vector of a user, we can
hash the concatenation of each static attribute and his/her
current dynamic key instead of directly hash static attributes.
Since the dynamic key changes when the user updates his/her
location, the hash values of the same static attribute are
completely different for users at different locations. It will
greatly increase the difficulty for the malicious adversary to
conduct dictionary profiling. However, it won’t bring much
more computation for ordinary user because of quite limited
lattice points in his/her vicinity range.
E. Profile Matching Protocols
We are now ready to present our privacy preserving profile
matching protocols. Here we present three different protocols
that achieve different levels of privacy protection.
Protocol 1: Privacy Preserving Profile Matching
1) The initiator encrypts a random number x and a public
predefined confirmation information in the secret message
by the required profile key, say EKt(confirmation, x).
And he/she sends the request package out.
2) A candidate relay user can verify whether he/she decrypts
the message correctly by the confirmation information. If
he/she does not match, he/she just forwards the request
to the next user. If he/she is matching, he/she can reply
the request by encrypting the predefined ack information
and a random number y along with any other message
(e.g. the intersection cardinality) by x, say Ex(ack, y),
and sends it back to the initiator.
1) Protocol 1: The scheme of Protocol 1 is based on the
basic mechanism. Under Protocol 1, a unmatched relay user
doesn’t know anything about the request. The matching user
knows the intersection of required profile and his/her own
profile after step 1 in the HBC model. A matching user
can decide whether to reply the request according to the
profile intersection. The initiator doesn’t know anything about
any participant until he/she gets a reply. With replies, he/she
knows the matching users and even the most similar replier
by the cardinality information. Then he/she can start secure
communication with a matching user protected by x + y or
with a group of matching user protected by x. However, in
malicious model, if the matching user has a dictionary of
the attributes and the size of dictionary is not large enough
unfortunately, he/she can learn the whole request profile by
the recovered profile vector.
2) Protocol 2: To prevent malicious participants, we design
Protocol 2, which is similar to Protocol 2, but it excludes the
confirmation information from the encrypted message.
Under Protocol 2, after the first round of communication, the
participants won’t known anything about the request in both
HBC model and malicious model. The initiator knows who are
the matching users and even the most similar one according to
the replies. Then the initiator can start secure communication
with a matching user protected by the key x + y or with a
group of matching users protected by x. In malicious model,
if a participant has a dictionary of the attributes, he/she may
construct a large candidate profile key set and send it to the
initiator. The main difference between an ordinary user and a
malicious user with a dictionary is the size of their attribute
space. An ordinary user with about dozens of attributes can
make a quick reaction and reply a small size acknowledge set.
Protocol 2: Privacy Preserving Profile Matching
1) The initiator encrypts a random number x in the secret
message without any confirmation information by the
required profile key, say EKt(x).
2) A candidate matching user cannot verify whether he/she
decrypts the message correctly. Let the candidate profile
key set of a candidate user be {K1c ,K2c , . . . ,Kzc }. He/she
decrypts the message in the request with each candidate
profile key to get a set of numbers, say X = {xj |xj =
D
K
j
c
(EKt(x))}. Then he/she encrypts the predefined ack
information and a random number y by each xj as the
key, and sends back the acknowledge set {Exj (ack, y)}
back to the initiator, for a public ack.
3) The initiator excludes the malicious replier whose re-
sponse time exceeds the time window or the cardinality
of reply set exceed the threshold.
While it takes much longer for a malicious user due to a large
number of candidate attribute combinations. So the initiator
can identify the malicious repliers by response time and the
cardinality of reply set.
Using our profile matching mechanism, it is impossible to
build an attribute dictionary in this social networking system.
If an adversary constructs the attribute dictionary from other
sources, e.g., other similar social networking systems, the
space of attributes are mostly very large, which makes the dic-
tionary profiling infeasible. Especially in the localizable social
mobile social networks, the vast dynamic location attribute will
greatly increase the difficulty of dictionary profiling. However,
there still may exist a special case that the attribute space is not
large enough in some social networks. In this case, in Protocol
1, the request profile may be exposed via dictionary profiling
by malicious participants. Although protocol 2 protects the
request profile from any participants, a malicious initiator may
learn the profile of unmatching repliers.
3) Protocol 3: To prevent the dictionary profiling by ma-
licious initiator, we improve Protocol 2 to Protocol 3 which
provides a user personal defined privacy protection.
Definition 4 (Attribute Entropy): For an attribute ai with ti
values {xj : j = 1, . . . , ti}. P (ai = xj) is the probability
that the attribute ai of a user equals xj . The entropy of the
attribute ai is S(ai) = −∑tij=1 P (ai = xj) logP (ai = xj).
Definition 5 (Profile Entropy): The entropy of a profile Ak
is S(Ak) =
∑mk
i=1 S(a
i).
Intuitively, the larger the entropy of a profile, the more
privacy information is contained in the profile. A participant
can determine his/her personal privacy protection level by
given a acceptable profile entropy leakage upper limit ϕ. Based
on the user defined protection level, Protocol 3 is ϕ-entropy
private for each user.
Definition 6 (ϕ-Entropy Private): A protocol is ϕ-entropy
private when the entropy of possible privacy leakage is not
greater than the upper limit ϕ: S(Leak(Ak)) ≤ ϕ.
The parameter ϕ is decided by each user. Here we suggest
two options to determine ϕ.
(1) K-anonymity based. To prevent from being identified by
disclosed attributes, the user will only send out messages
protected by the profile key generated from the subset of
attributes which at least k users own the same subset. Let
a subset of Ak be Ask = a1, . . . , al. Suppose that the ti
values of ai have equal probability, then there are n∏l
i=1
ti
users are expected to own the same subset. If the user
require that n∏l
i=1 t
i
≥ k, then log∏li=1 ti ≤ log nk , ie
S(Ask) ≤ log nk . So the parameter ϕ could be log nk .
(2) Sensitive attributes based. The user can determine the
sensitive attributes which must not be disclosed according
to the current context. Let the set of sensitive attributes
defined by user vk is Ask, then ϕ = min(S(ai)), where
ai ∈ Ask.
Protocol 3: Privacy Preserving Profile Matching
1) The initiator encrypts a random number x in the secret
message without any confirmation information by the
required profile key, say EKt(x).
2) A candidate matching user cannot verify whether he/she
decrypts the message correctly. He/she selects a set of
candidate profile {A1c , A2c , . . . , Azc} which satisfies that
S(
⋃z
i=1 A
i
c) ≤ ϕ. And he/she generates the correspond-
ing candidate profile keys {K1c ,K2c , . . . ,Kzc }. He/she
decrypts the message in the request with each candidate
profile key to get a set of numbers, say X = {xj |xj =
D
K
j
c
(EKt(x))}. Then he/she encrypts the predefined ack
information and a random number y by each xj , and
sends back the acknowledge set {Exj (ack, y)} back to
the initiator.
3) The initiator excludes the malicious replier whose re-
sponse time exceeds the time window or the cardinality
of reply set exceed the threshold and decrypts the replies
with x. If he/she gets a correct ack information from a
reply, the corresponding replier is matching.
Protocol 3 is private when the initiator is not malicious. and
it is ϕ-private for each participant even when the initiator can
conduct a dictionary profiling.
Note that, for all three protocols, each request has a valid
time. An expired request will be dropped. And each user has a
request frequency limit, all participants won’t reply the request
from the same user within a short time interval.
F. Establishing Secure Communication Channel
As presented in the profile matching protocols, the random
number x generated by the initiator and y generated by a
matching user have been exchanged secretly between them. x
and y is the communication key shared by a pair of matching
users. So the secure peer to peer communication channel can
be constructed. Our mechanism realizes key exchange between
matching users which is resistant to the man in the middle
attack.
Furthermore, our mechanism can be easily adopted to
discover the community consisting of users with similar profile
as the initiator and establish the group key x for secure intra-
community communication.
IV. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security and performance
of our profile matching and secure communication channel
establishing mechanism.
A. Security and Privacy Analysis
1) Profile Privacy: During the generation of the profile key,
we don’t use the hash value of the static attribute directly.
Instead, we use the hash value (with hash function SHA-256)
of the combination of the static attribute and the dynamic
attribute (i.e. location), which greatly increases the protection
of the static attribute. We use AES with 256 bit key as the
encryption method. The 256-bit profile key is used as the
secret key to encrypt the message by AES. Only the encrypted
message will be transmitted, and no attribute hash value will
be transmitted. No one can obtain other user’s attribute hash.
Therefore no one can build a dictionary of hash values of
attributes via this social networking system. To acquire the
profile information of the initiator or other participants the
attacker need to decrypt the request/reply message correctly
and confirm the correctness. This is extremely difficult due to
the choice of SHA-256 and 256-bit-key AES.
TABLE I
THE PRIVACY PROTECTION LEVEL OF OUR PROTOCOLS IN HBC MODEL.
vI IS THE INITIATOR, vM IS A MATCHING USER AND vU IS A
UNMATCHING USER. AI , AM AND AU ARE THEIR CORRESPONDING
PROFILES.
PPL (AI , vM ) (AI , vU ) (AM , vI ) (AU , vI )
Protocol 1 1 3 2 3
Protocol 2 3 3 2 3
Protocol 3 3 3 2 3
PSI 3 3 1 1
PCSI 3 3 |AI ∩ vU | |AI ∩ vU |
In the honest-but-curious (HBC) model each user only
knows his/her own attributes. Therefore, only users owning
matching attributes can generate the same profile key and
decrypt each other’s messages correctly. Unmatched user
cannot obtain any information from the encrypted message.
Table I presents the protection level of our three protocols
during the matching procedure in HBC model. Compared to
the existing PSI and PCSI approaches, our protocols provide
Level 2 privacy protection for matching users and don’t leak
any information to unmatching users.. After profile matching,
under Protocol 1, the initiator knows nothing until the match-
ing user replies; under Protocol 2 and 3, a user won’t learn
he/she is matching until the initiator contacts him/her.
In the malicious model, for the adversary who intends to
learn the attributes hash to build a dictionary, it is impossible
in our social networking system, as a result of that no attribute
information is transmitted in any data packets. But we still
consider the unlikely case that an adversary constructs an
attribute dictionary from other sources, e.g., other similar
social networking systems. We suppose that the adversary can
eavesdrop all communication.
In most cases, the cardinality m of the dictionary is very
large, which makes the dictionary profiling difficult. With a
remainder vector, it takes an adversary (m
p
)mt guesses to
compromise a user’s profile with mt attributes. Here p is a
small prime number like 11. In tencent weibo, we found that
m ≃ 220 and the average attribute number of each user is 6.
When the adversary tries to guess a user’s profile by brute
force, it will take about 2100 guesses. If considering keywords
of a user, m is even larger. Especially in localizable mobile
social networks, the vast dynamic location attribute will greatly
increase the attribute set. The dictionary profiling gets more
infeasible.
However, the worst case may still exist that the adversary
obtains the attribute dictionary and the dictionary size is
not large enough. This kind of adversary also compromises
other PSI based approaches. Table II shows the protection
level of our protocols in this worst case. In this case, our
Protocol 1 cannot protect the initiator’s privacy from the
dictionary profiling. But it provides Level 2 privacy protection
for replying matching users and unconditional Level 3 privacy
for unmatching users. Protocol 2 provides unconditional Level
3 privacy for the initiator. It also provides unconditional
Level 3 privacy for all participants against any other person
except the initiator. Only if the initiator is an adversary with
the dictionary, he/she may compromise the candidate user’s
privacy. Although candidate users are just a small potion of
users, to improve Protocol 2 to protect their privacy, we design
Protocol 3 which still provides unconditional Level 3 privacy
for the initiator and incardinate users, and Level 3 privacy
for the candidate users against any other person except the
initiator. Moreover, it provides personal defined ϕ-entropy
private for all candidate users against an malicious initiator.
2) Communication Security: Our protocols realize secure
key exchange between matching users based on their common
attributes. The shared secret key is protected by the profile key,
only the user who owns the matching attributes can generate
the same profile keys. As the security analysis of our protocols,
Protocol 2 and 3 can construct a secure communication
between a matching user and the initiator against any other
adversary in both HBC and malicious model. So our secure
communication channel establishment between matching users
thwarts the MITM attack.
3) Verifiability: In majority of existing profiling matching
approaches, only one party learns the result and tells the other
party. Hence, one party can lie about the result. There lacks
a feasible way for the other party to verify the result. Our
protocols are verifiable and resists cheating. In Protocol 1,
after the matching, only the matching user learns the result
and he/she contacts the initiator by relying Ex(ack, y). In the
HBC model, an unmatching user cannot obtain the correct x
encrypted by the request profile key, so he/she cannot cheat
the initiator to pretend to be matching. In Protocol 2 and
3, similarly, only the matching user can get the correct x
TABLE II
THE PRIVACY PROTECTION LEVEL OF OUR PROTOCOLS IN MALICIOUS MODEL WITH SMALL DICTIONARY. vI IS THE INITIATOR, vM IS A MATCHING
USER AND vU IS A UNMATCHING USER. AI , AM AND AU ARE THEIR CORRESPONDING PROFILES. v′I IS A MALICIOUS INITIATOR WITH A PROFILE
DICTIONARY. v′P IS A MALICIOUS PARTICIPANT WITH A PROFILE DICTIONARY EAVESDROPPING THE COMMUNICATION.
PPL (AI , v
′
P
) (AM , v
′
I
) (AM , v
′
P
) (AU , v
′
I
) (AU , v
′
P
)
Protocol 1 0 2 2 3 3
Protocol 2 3 2 3 3 (noncandidate)
Ac (candidate) 3
Protocol 3 3 ϕ-entropy 3 3 (noncandidate)
ϕ-entropy (candidate) 3
Consequently, the initiator can only obtain the correct y of
matching user. So both the initiator and participants cannot
cheat each other. In the malicious model with a dictionary,
it takes an adversary much longer time to guess the correct
key. Hence a nonmalicious user can distinguish the adversary
by his/her reply delay. So no cheating can be conducted
successfully with our protocols.
B. Performance Analysis
1) Computational Cost: For an initiator, it takes mt logmt
operations for sorting attributes, mt + 1 hashing operations
for profile key generation and mt modulo operations for
remainder vector generation. γ(γ+β) operations are needed to
calculate the hint matrix if the required similarity θ < 100%.
In addition, one symmetric encryption is needed with the
profile key.
For a participant vk, it takes mk logmk operations for
sorting its attributes, mk hashing for profile vector generation
and mk modulo operations for remainder calculation. After
fast checking by remainder vector, if a participant vk is not a
candidate user, no more computation is need. If vk is a candi-
date user, let the number of his candidate profile vector be κk.
It takes this user κk hashing to generate candidate profile keys.
If there is a hint matrix, user vk need to solve κk γ(γ + β)-
dimension linear equation systems. The computation cost is
κkm
3
t . In the end, κk symmetric decryptions with the profile
key. Note that the expected κk is ε(κk) =
(
mk
α+β
)×
(
1
p
)α+β
.
For example, in Tencent Weibo the average attribute number
is 6 and the maximum number is 20. Then if α + β = 6,
even a large mk = 20 and small prime number p = 11 result
in a very small ε(κk) = 0.02. So it takes small computation
cost even for a candidate user. We can show that the expected
candidate users is only a small portion of all users and the
portion decreases greatly with the increase of mt and p. It
may be considered that larger p will weaken the security
due to the decreased difficulty of dictionary profiling. Our
testing and analysis show that even a small p, e.g., p = 11,
can significantly reduce the number of candidate users. So an
initiator can choose a proper p to efficiently control the amount
of candidate users as well as achieve the secure protection of
profile privacy.
In implementation, we use SHA-256 as the hashing method
and AES as the symmetric encryption method. The data
processing performance of SHA-256 is 111MB/s for a single-
threaded implementation on an Intel 1.83GHz processor in
32-bit operation system. Furthermore, for all users the sorting
and hashing results are calculated once and used repetitively
until the attributes are updated, e.g., the location changes. AES
performs well on a wide variety of hardware, from 8-bit smart
cards to high-performance computers. The throughput of AES
is about 60MB/s on a 1.7GHz processor and about 400MB/s
on Intel i5/i7 CPUs. Compared to the existing approaches, we
don’t use an asymmetric-key cryptosystem and the remainder
vector can significantly reduce the computation of unmatching
users. In all, our protocol are computationally efficient.
2) Communication Cost: In our protocols there isn’t any
pre-operation for key exchange or secure channel construction.
To conduct profile matching with all users, the initiator only
need one broadcast to send the request to all participants. The
request consists of a 32mt bit remainder vector and a 256 bit
encrypted message. If the required similarity θ < 100%, there
is also a 32γ(γ+β)+256γ bit hint matrix. So the size of the
request message is at most (1−θ)32m2t+(288−256θ)mt+256
bits. For example, the user of Tencent Weibo has 6 tags in
average and 20 tags at most. To search a 60% similar user,
the request is about 190B in average and 1KB at most. In
Protocol 1, only the matching user will reply the request. So
the transmission cost of Protocol 1 is one broadcast and O(1)
unicasts. In Protocol 2, only the candidate matching user will
reply the request. So the transmission cost of Protocol 2 is
one broadcast and O(n∗( 1
p
)mtθ) unicasts. For example, when
p = 11, mt = 6, θ = 0.6, there are only about 15610 fraction
of users will reply. In Protocol 3, the communication cost of
reply is even smaller than Protocol 2 because of the personal
privacy setting. Note that the reply in all three protocols is
only 32Byte. So the communication cost of our protocols is
quite small. This makes our protocols suitable for wireless
communication environment, for example the mobile social
networks.
3) Further Comparison With Related Work: In this section,
we mainly compare the computation cost and communication
cost between our protocols and PSI and PCSI based ap-
proaches. The computation time comparison with dot product
based on approach presented in [9].
First we define the basic operations of other asymmetric
cryptosystem based approaches:
• M1: 24-bit modular multiplication;
• M2: 1024-bit modular multiplication;
• M3: 2048-bit modular multiplication;
• E2: 1024-bit exponentiation;
• E3: 2048-bit exponentiation.
Then we define the basic operation in our protocol:
• H: one SHA-256 hashing operation of an attribute;
• M: is the operation that the 256-bit hash of an attribute
modulo the small prime p;
• E : AES-256 encryption;
• D: AES-256 decryption.
Table III presents the computation and communication cost
of related work and our protocol. Because the SHA-256,
modulo, and AES-256 operations in our protocol are much
cheaper than the 1024-bit and 2048-bit modular multiplication
and exponentiation, our protocol costs much less computation
than asymmetric-key based schemes. The transmitted data size
are significantly reduced because basically only one encrypted
256-bit message and one 32 ∗mt bit remainder vector need to
be transmitted. Furthermore, the remainder vector eliminates
the reply from most unmatching users. So the total transmis-
sion time is also reduced.
V. EVALUATION USING REAL DATA
A. Real Social Networking System Analysis
Our evaluations are based on the profile data of Tencent
Weibo [2]. Tencent Weibo is one of the largest micro-blogging
websites in China, which is a platform for building friendship
and sharing interests online. This dataset has 2.32 million users
personal profiles, including the following information: the year
of birth, the gender, the tags and keywords. Tags are selected
by users to represent their interests. Keywords are extracted
from the tweet/retweet/comment of a user, and can be used as
features to better represent the user.
In the Tencent Weibo dataset, the cardinality of the tag set
is 560419 and the cardinality of the keywords set if 713747.
Each user has 6 tags in average and 20 tags at most to
represent his/her interest. On average, 7 keywords extracted
for a user. The maximum number of keywords of a user is
129. So when the adversary tries to guess a user’s profile with
6 tags by brute force, it will take him/her about 1030 guesses.
Moreover, the large attribute space makes the vector-based
matching approaches impractical.
There is a question that, would many users own the same
profile? Each profile is a combination of several attributes.
When more than one users have the same profile, we say
there are collisions for this profile. Figure 4 shows that both
in Tencent and Facebook more than 90% users have unique
profiles.
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B. Computation Performance
We then exam the computation performance of our protocols
on mobile devices and PC. The mobile phone is HTC G17
with 1228Hz CPU, 1GB ROM and 1GB RAM. The laptop is
Think Pad X1 with i7 2.7GHz CPU and 4GB RAM. Table IV
shows the mean execution time of basic computation. And we
evaluate our protocol on the Tencent Weibo dataset, Table VI
presents the breakdown of time cost for our protocol. As an
example, for a user with 6 attributes, the time need to generate
a request is only about 3.9×10−2 ms on laptop and 1.3 ms on
mobile phone. On average it takes a non-candidate user about
3.9 × 10−2 ms on laptop and 0.63 ms on phone to process
the request. A little more extra computation is required for a
candidate user, and the computation cost is about 4 × 10−2
ms on laptop and 7 ms on phone for each candidate key.
The time cost of all the operations in our protocols are
quite small compared with the computation time of existing
asymmetric cryptosystem based approaches, e.g. the evaluation
result of [9]. Table V-B shows a typical scenario in a mobile
social network with 100 users. The numbers of attributes are
chosen based on the analysis of Tencent Weibo. With the
numerical comparison, it is clearly that our protocol is efficient
in both computation and communication.
TABLE IV
MEAN COMPUTATION TIME FOR OUR BASIC OPERATION.(MS)
SHA-256 Mod p AES Enc
Laptop 1.2× 10−3 3.1× 10−4 8.7× 10−4
Phone 4.8× 10−2 5.7× 10−2 2.1× 10−2
Multiply-256 Compare-256 AES Dec
Laptop 1.4× 10−4 1.0× 10−5 9.6× 10−4
Phone 3.2× 10−2 1.0× 10−3 2.5× 10−2
TABLE V
MEAN COMPUTATION TIME FOR BASIC OPERATIONS FOR ASYMMETRIC
CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED SCHEME.(MS)
1024-exp 2048-exp 1024-mul 2048-mul
Laptop 17 120 2.3× 10−2 1× 10−1
Phone 34 197 1.5× 10−1 2.4× 10−1
TABLE VI
DECOMPOSED COMPUTATION TIME OF OUR PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE
TENCENT WEIBO DATASET.(MS)
Laptop
Mean Min Max
MatrixGen 7.2× 10−3 1.0× 10−3 2.4× 10−2
KeyGen 8.1× 10−3 2.3× 10−3 2.5× 10−2
RemainderGen 1.9× 10−3 3.1× 10−4 6.2× 10−3
HintGen 4.7× 10−3 2.8× 10−4 5.6× 10−2
HintSolve 3× 10−2 1.1× 10−3 1.1
Phone
Mean Min Max
MatrixGen 2.6× 10−1 4.4× 10−2 8.9× 10−1
KeyGen 6.3× 10−2 4.8× 10−2 1.4× 10−1
RemainderGen 3.4× 10−1 5.7× 10−2 1.14
HintGen 1.2 1.4× 10−1 12
HintSolve 6.9 2.6× 10−1 250
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY WITH EXISTING SCHEME.q = 256
Party FNP [10] FC10 [7] Advanced [14] Protocol 1
Computation P1
Pk
(2mt +mkn)E3
mk logmtE3
(2.5mtn)M2
(mt +mk)E2
(3mtn)E3
2mtE3
(mt + 1)H+mtM+ E
mkH+mkM (noncandidate)
κkγ
2(γ + β) + (mk + κk)H
+mkM+ κkD (candidate)
Communication
bits All 8q(mt +mkn) 4qn(3mt +mk)
24[mtmkn
+tn(8mt + 2mk + 12mtt)]
+16qmtn
(1− θ)32m2t + (288 − qθ)mt
+q + qn ∗ ( 1
p
)mtθ
Communication
Transimission All
1 broadcast
n unicasts 2n unicasts 5n unicasts
1 broadcast
n ∗ ( 1
p
)mtθ unicasts
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY WITH EXISTING SCHEME IN TYPICAL SCENARIO. mt = mk = 6, γ = β = 3, p = 11, n = 100, t = 4.
Party FNP [10] FC10 [7] Advanced [14] Protocol 1
Computation P1
Pk
612E3
5E3
1500M2
12E2
1800E3
12E3
7H+ 6M+ E(P1)
6H+ 6M (noncandidate)
27κk + (6 + κk)H + 6M+ κkD (candidate)
Computation(ms) P1
Pk
73440
600
34.5
204
216000
1440
1.1× 10−2(P1)
3.1× 10−3(noncandidate)
6κk × 10
−3 + 9.1× 10−3 (candidate)
Communication(KB) All 151 300 704 0.22
Communication
Transimission All
1 broadcast
100 unicasts 200 unicasts 500 unicasts
1 broadcast
number of candidates unicasts
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Fig. 6. Candidate user proportion with different similarity and prime number.
C. Performance Evaluations
Based on the user attributes of Tencent Weibo, we evaluate
the efficiency of our protocols. Two typical situations are taken
into consideration. In the first case, all users have equal size of
attributes which is similar to the vector based scheme. We use
the attribute data of all 52248 users with 6 attributes. In the
second case, we randomly sample 1000 users from all users
to conduct profile matching.
In both cases, we exam the similarity between all pairs of
users as the ground truth. Then we run our profile matching
protocols at different similarity levels. Figure 6 shows the
number of candidate users of our protocol change with similar-
ity requirement and the prime number p. The result shows that
in both cases, the number of candidate users approaches the
number of true matching users with increasing p. And a small
p can achieve small size of candidate users and significantly
reduce unwanted computation and communication cost for
unmatching users.
There is a worry that, the candidate profile key set may be
very large for candidate users. Figure 7 presents the number
of candidate profile keys during the matching with different
similarity level and prime p. The result shows that in real
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Fig. 7. Size of candidate profile key set with different similarities.
social networking system like Tencent Weibo, the candidate
key set is small enough to achieve efficient computation for
candidate users.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Privacy Preserving Friending
Most previous private matching work are based on the
secure multi-party computation (SMC) [25]. There are two
mainstreams of approaches to solve the private profile-based
friending problem. The first category is based on private set
intersection (PSI) and private cardinality of set intersection
(PCSI). Early work in this category mainly address the private
set operation problem in database research, e.g. [3], [7], [10],
[13], [19], [26]. Work like [17] studied the problem of private
k nearest neighbor search. Later on some work treat a user’s
profile as multiple attributes chosen from a public set of
attributes and provide well-designed protocols to privately
match users’ profiles based on PSI and PCSI, [14], [23].
The second category is based on private vector dot product
[12]. [9] considers a user’s profile as vector which represents
his/her social coordinate, and the social proximity between
two uses as the matching metric. It calculates the metric by
private dot product. A trusted central server is requited to
precompute users social coordinates and generate certifications
and keys. [28] improves these work with a fine-grained private
matching by associating a user-specific numerical value with
every attribute to indicate the level of interest. However, most
these approaches lacks a specific definition of matching user.
For example, in the PSI based schemes, any user can learn the
profile intersection with any other user despite the similarity
between them. The PCSI and dot product based approaches
cannot support a precise specific profile matchings.
These protocols often rely on public-key cryptosystem
and/or homomorphic encryption, which results in expensive
computation cost and usually requires a trusted third party.
Even non-matching users involve in the expensive computa-
tion. Multiple rounds of interactions are required to perform
the private profile matching between each pair of parties.
They all need preset procedure, e.g. exchanging public keys
before matching, precomputing vector [9], establishing secure
communication channel and share secret [14]. Furthermore,
these protocols are unverifiable.
B. Establishing Secure Channel
Secure communication channel construction is very impor-
tant in practical private friending system but is often ignored.
Secure communication channels are usually set up by authen-
ticated key agreement protocols. This can be performed by
relying on a public-key infrastructure, e.g., based on RSA or
the Diffie-Hellman protocol [8]. The public-key based methods
allow parties to share authenticated information about each
other, however they need a trusted third party. Although Diffie-
Hellman key exchange method allows two parties that have
no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared
secret key, it needs multiple interactions between two parties
and is known to be vulnerable to the Man-in-the-Middle attack.
Device pairing is a another technique to generate a common
secret between two devices that shared no prior secrets with
minimum or without additional hardware. Examples include
the ”resurrecting duckling” [20], ”talking-to-strangers” [4],
”seeing-is-believing” [15] and Short Authenticated Strings
(SAS) based key agreement [22] and [16]. However, they
employ some out-of-band secure channel to exchange authen-
ticated information or leverage the ability of users to authen-
ticate each other by visual and verbal contact. In addition, the
interaction cost is still not well suited to decentralized mobile
social networks where secure connections are needed between
all parties at once. With these existing schemes, it is more
complicated to establish a group key.
C. Attribute Based Encryption
Attribute based encryption is designed for access control
of shared encrypted data stored in a server. Only the user
possessing a certain set of credentials or attributes is able to
access data. It was introduced by Sahai and Waters [18], and
then later improved in [5], [6], [11]. All the ABE schemes
rely on asymmetric-key cryptosystem, which cost expensive
computation.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a novel symmetric-encryption based
privacy-preserving profile matching and secure communica-
tion channel establishment mechanism in decentralized social
networks without any presetting or trusted third party. We
take advantage of the common attributes between matching
users to encrypt a secret message with a channel key in
it. Several protocols were proposed for achieving different
levels of privacy. We rigorously compared the performances of
our protocols with existing protocols and conducted extensive
evaluations on the performances using a large scale dataset
from real social networking.
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